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30 End of Mission Considerations 
Scott M. Hull, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
While a great deal of effort goes into planning and executing successful mission 
operations, it is also important to consider the End of the Mission during the planning, 
design, and operations phases of any mission.  Spacecraft and launch vehicles must be 
disposed of properly in order to limit the generation of orbital debris, and better preserve 
the orbital environment for all future missions.  Figure 30-1 shows a 1990’s projected 
growth of debris with and without the use of responsible disposal techniques.  This 
requires early selection of a responsible disposal scenario, so that the necessary 
capabilities can be incorporated into the hardware designs.  The mission operations must 
then be conducted in such a way as to preserve, and then actually perform, the planned, 
appropriate end of mission disposal. 
Figure 30-1  Debris Growth with Various Mitigation Approaches 
(reference iii, page 22) 
 
Computer simulations have shown that  the orbital debris population already present on-
orbit is self- propagating; that is, the orbital debris density will continue to increase 
through random collisions alone, unless reduced by outside effortsi
End of Mission disposal (also known as End of Life disposal, Decommissioning, or 
simply Disposal) has been addressed primarily at the international level in discussions by 
the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).  The IADC is an 
international forum of national space agencies and the European Space Agency (ESA) for 
the coordination of activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in 
space
.  This may well result 
in a cascade effect that eventually renders some orbits impractical for space operations.  
Since it is not yet economically practical to remove a significant amount of existing 
debris from orbit, it is critical that responsible end of mission disposal be practiced for all 
current and future missions, in order to help control the rate of increase of mission-lethal 
debris objects in commonly used orbits.  Had such methods been employed throughout 
the history of space operations, the cascade effect might have been prevented, or at least 
substantially delayed. 
ii. In 2002, the IADC issued a set of guidelines (IADC-02-01) addressing, among 
other things, prevention of post mission explosions, and acceptable disposal options.  
These guidelines, described in Section 30.1,  were slightly refined in 2007. 
Spacecraft  mission designers need to consider disposal early in the design process , 
in order to incorporate the necessary hardware and procedures to ensure a safe disposal.  
The first step is to select a baseline disposal method, as described in Sections 30.2 and 
30.3 below.  That disposal method will determine the key design factors which will need 
to be considered throughout the remainder of the design process.  It may, for example, be 
necessary to size the propulsion system and navigation hardware for an orbit change or 
controlled reentry.  Alternatively, it may be necessary to design the power and propulsion 
systems for postmission passivation, as described in Section 30.4.  As the design 
develops, and the reentry risk is determined, it is occasionally necessary to change the 
baselined disposal method, but at a cost which increases dramatically as the design 
matures.  In any event, it will be necessary to develop and test spacecraft operations 
procedures specific to the disposal (Section 30.5).  The disposal of the FireSat II and SCS 
sample missions are discussed in Section 30.6, as examples of the application of the 
disposal principles.  Early consideration of the end of mission disposal is among the most 
effective ways to minimize the growth of orbital debris, to the benefit of all missions. 
30.1 IADC End of Mission Guidelines 
While they do represent agreements among the leading space agencies of the world, it is 
important to note that the IADC guidelines are not currently legally binding.  They are 
generally reflected, however, in numerous national space policies, and are followed at 
least in part for the majority of scientific and military space missions.  Despite whether 
commercial and other missions are legally bound to comply with the IADC guidelines, 
meeting the standards has been shown to be crucial for limiting the growth of orbital 
debris, which is in the interests of all space users.  The guidelines are summarized here, 
and the specific text is readily available on the internet.  In addition, there is a “Support 
Document to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” (IADC-04-06), which 
provides valuable insights and background information on the specific guidelines. 
The IADC guidelines provide guidance for limiting the generation of orbital debris both 
during and after space operations.  They begin by describing the need for limiting the 
growth of orbital debris, and defining the relevant terms used throughout the document.  
The guidelines refer to direct creation of debris through operational debris (lens caps, for 
example), and potential breakage of tethers.  They also consider on-orbit breakups caused 
by explosions during and after the mission, as well as intentional destruction by internal 
or external sources.  The guidelines also define accepted disposal orbits and other 
conditions such as the timeline for abandoning commonly used orbits, and controlling the 
risk to people and property on the Earth.  Finally, they address limiting the potential for 
damage by collisions with other space objects and with small orbital debris that could 
prevent the ability to successfully execute end of mission disposal.  The IADC guidelines 
are written to apply throughout the mission lifetime, from design through operations and 
decommissioning. 
It is worth noting that while the IADC Guidelines do lay the foundation for general 
agreements on the limitation of orbital debris, with few exceptions they do not provide 
specific quantitative requirements.  In fact, the stated purpose of the guidelines is to 
“demonstrate the international consensus on space debris mitigation activities and 
constitute a baseline that can support agencies and organizations when they establish their 
own mitigation standards”.  Only in the case of the definitions of the protected orbit 
regions, and the GEO disposal conditions, do the guidelines provide specific limits.  The 
remaining limitations are described as qualitative measures, which are left to individual 
agency requirements documents to define in detail. 
In addition to the IADC guidelines, various other organizations have adopted similar 
guidelines and requirements.  In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed 
the “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space”, which are very similar to, and cover the same general topics as, the IADC 
guidelines, while being generally less specific.  Most nations look to their national space 
agency (often an IADC member) for orbital debris policy and control.  The United States, 
however, has issued not only the “US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices”, but also has a number of individual agency documents that address orbital 
debris limitation to varying degrees.  In general, the requirements documents issued by 
the IADC member agencies themselves are the most specific and restrictive.  Examples 
of national orbital debris limitation documents are shown in Table 30.1-1. 
Table 30.1-1  International Orbital Debris Limitation Documents 
(self-generated) 
Domain Document 
IADC IADC-02-01, Rev 1 
   US 
Government 
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices 
      NASA NPR 8715.6A, NASA-STD-8719.14  
      US DoD DoD Space Policy Directive, 3100.10, AFI 91-217 
      US FAA Title 14, CFR Part 415.39 
   Japan  JAXA JMR-003 
   France CNES  MPM-50-00-12 
   Europe (ESA) European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation 
   Russia Space Technology Items. General Requirements on 
Mitigation Of Space Debris Population 
 
30.2 LEO Disposal Options 
Responsible exit from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is one of the most important steps that can 
be taken to limit the growth of debris in that region of space.  An IADC working group 
has examined the long-term effects of various guideline optionsiii, and shown that by 
limiting the amount of time that each vehicle remains in LEO, growth of the orbital 
debris environment is greatly reduced.  Thus, it is desirable and recommended for space 
objects (both launch vehicle stages and spacecraft) to be removed from the LEO region as 
soon as practical.  The minimum orbital lifetime possible for an individual vehicle might 
be determined, however, by the remaining maneuvering capability of the vehicle at the 
end of the mission or by the initial orbit.  There are three basic approaches to LEO 
disposal.  The most desirable, if possible, is to perform a controlled (or ‘targeted’) reentry 
into an unpopulated region of ocean soon after the end of the mission, either using on-
board propulsion or by external retrieval.  If this is not possible, it may be possible to 
boost into a storage orbit between LEO and GEO, safely removed from both regions.  
Finally, a spacecraft can be allowed to reduce its orbit by atmospheric drag, resulting in 
an uncontrolled reentry and impact on an unpredictable portion of the Earth’s surface. 
Controlled reentry is the preferred LEO disposal method for several reasons.  Not only 
does it provide positive removal of the vehicle from orbit, but the removal also tends to 
occur as soon as possible after the mission.  By selecting a reentry location over a large 
unoccupied area of ocean, the reentry risk to the ground population is minimized.  This, 
along with the lack of postmission passivation, can result in greater flexibility for the 
mission hardware designers.  Controlled reentry is not without significant challenges, 
however.  Reentry maneuvers typically require extensive planning, and notification to the 
relevant air and maritime traffic authorities prior to performing the maneuvers.  In 
practice, controlled reentry is best performed using at least three separate maneuvers in 
order to better control and refine the orbit, with a final perigee of less than 50 km, to 
prevent atmospheric skip.  In order to accomplish this, the spacecraft design must 
incorporate sufficiently large thrusters to ensure adequate control authority at low 
altitude.  Controlled reentry also requires that the vehicle reserve sufficient fuel to 
reliably perform the reentry maneuvers at the end of the mission, which will result in a 
larger fuel mass at launch.  Section 9.6 discusses the ΔV needed to accomplish controlled 
reentry, and gives examples.  With the advent of robotic servicing and retrieval 
capabilities, it also may become a practical option for missions to further extend mission 
lifetime, and still perform a controlled reentry, but at the expense of an additional launch. 
Disposal into a storage, or ‘graveyard’, orbit may be a practical option for some high-
altitude LEO missions.  The storage region is located between LEO and GEO, and is 
generally considered to extend from 2000 km to approximately 35,586 km (GEO – 200 
km) altitude.  Within this region, however, care must be taken to also avoid commonly 
used orbits, such as the circular 12 hour orbits used by navigation and other satellites.  
Both the apogee and perigee of the disposal orbit must be within the storage orbit region.  
As with controlled reentry, the spacecraft design must incorporate sufficiently large 
maneuvering thrusters, and fuel must be reserved for the orbit raising operation.  Figure 
30.2-1 shows the typical ΔV required to maneuver from a circular LEO orbit to the 2000 
km storage orbit.   Any vehicle left in a storage orbit must be passivated at the end of the 
mission, as described in a later section.  In general, only those missions operating above 
about 1400 km altitude can reach the storage orbit region with less delta V than re-
entering within the recommended timeframe. 
If neither controlled reentry nor storage orbit disposal are practical for a LEO mission, 
then disposal will eventually occur by uncontrolled reentry.  If possible, the final altitude 
and Area–to-Mass Ratio need to be tailored to ensure that a reentry by atmospheric drag 
is predicted to occur within 25 years after the end of the mission.  The IADC study 
mentioned above concluded that this orbit duration is a reasonable compromise between 
unlimited orbital lifetimes and immediate de-orbit at the end of the mission.  For a 
spacecraft with no propulsion system, that limits the maximum orbit altitude to about 600 
to 700 km, depending on the Area–to-Mass Ratio and launch year.  Figure 30.2-1 shows 
the typical ΔV required to maneuver from a circular LEO orbit to an orbit that will 
reenter the atmosphere within 25 years.  Note that the solar flux is an important 
component of this prediction, and varies throughout the solar cycle, complicating the 
reentry date prediction considerably.  Current predictions of future solar activity are 
available for download from NASA, NOAA, and other sources, and are typically updated 
frequently.  Earlier orbit decay will further reduce the likelihood of collision, and is 
therefore recommended if possible. 
Figure 30.2-1  Disposal Delta-V Requirements 
(self-generated, see Excel spreadsheet “SMAD End of Mission Calculations.xls”) 
 
 
While at first glance uncontrolled reentry may appear to be a preferred disposal method 
(it is surely the simplest and lowest mass approach), there are considerable challenges to 
doing so responsibly.  It is necessary for any non-operational object left in orbit to be 
passivated during the orbit-decay period, as discussed in Section 30.4, in order to prevent 
inadvertent explosion or breakup during the potentially long orbit decay period.  The risk 
to the ground population may also be controlled by requirements of the launching or 
operating organization.  For example, several space agencies require a detailed 
assessment to show that the spacecraft hardware will burn up sufficiently during 
atmospheric reentry to pose less than a 1 in 10,000 risk of causing a serious injury to even 
one human.  In some cases, the risk to the public from an uncontrolled reentry is 
sufficient to dictate that a controlled reentry is the only acceptable method of disposal 
from LEO. 
Meeting a requirement to limit reentry risk can be extremely difficult or impossible for 
some large spacecraft, and usually necessitates specialized design techniques and 
materials selection.   The risk is determined by how much of the spacecraft survives 
reentry, and by the ground population over which the reentering debris might land.  In the 
case of an uncontrolled reentry, the surviving debris might land anywhere in the latitude 
band covered by the orbit inclination, so an average population density over this band is 
used for the risk estimate.  Object survivability is largely driven by the thermal properties 
of the primary construction material for the object in question, expressed as a heat of 
ablation.  Heat of ablation is typically expressed in terms of mass, but it can also be 
useful to express it in terms of volume (multiplying by the material density), for 
comparing two material options for the same size part. 
Heat of Ablation = Specific Heat  x Δ Temperature + Latent Heat of Fusion 
The heats of ablation for several typical spacecraft materials are shown in Table 30.2-1.   
Notice that materials such as aluminum and graphite/epoxy composite are readily 
demiseable, whereas titanium, glass, and beryllium all have high heats of ablation, and 
should therefore be avoided when possible, if reentry risk is a concern.  In general, 
objects made from materials with melting temperature greater than 1000 K, or heat of 
ablation greater than 1000 kJ/kg or 2500 kJ/m3 are more likely to survive atmospheric 
reentry.  Oxidation heating (essentially burning) on reentry also contributes the 
demisability of aluminum and graphite/ epoxy. 











Graphite/Epoxy 700 350 550 
Aluminum 850 900 2400 
Stainless Steel 1700 900 7250 
Titanium 1940 1600 7050 
Zerodur Glass 2000 1400 3550 
Beryllium 1557 4100 7550 
 
Object survivability is also influenced by the object’s ballistic coefficient, which is a 
function of the shape, mass, and dimensions of the object, and determines its velocity.  In 
general, faster moving objects accumulate more heat, and are more likely to demise.  
Reentry risk has been successfully reduced on some flight missions by modifying a 
component’s shape, size, or material, when possible.   Another approach that can be used 
to reduce the reentry risk is to ensure that several high survivability objects are bound 
together, since multiple objects are more likely to cause injury than a single object.  For 
example, if several surviving battery cells are contained within a robust battery box, then 
the single surviving box presents less risk than the multiple cells would.  Because the 
survivability of spacecraft components depends on so many factors, it is necessary to 
combine very specialized assessment software with detailed knowledge of the spacecraft 
construction in order to determine and limit the reentry risk.  Early avoidance of high 
survivability materials in component designs can help to prevent difficult and expensive 
redesigns late in the design phase. 
For all LEO mission disposal options, it is desirable to minimize the total time that a 
vehicle spends in orbit.  This is done to reduce the likelihood that the vehicle will 
experience collisions with resident objects, which usually result in the creation of 
additional orbital debris.  Debris generation potential increases rapidly with projectile 
size, and even existing objects as small as 1 cm can create additional debris on impact.   
Simulations predict that on-orbit collisions will be the primary source of new orbital 
debris, so minimizing orbital lifetime is the most important step toward limiting future 
debris generation.  Figure 30.2-2 shows that even with no new launches, collisions among 
existing on-orbit  objects will eventually cause the debris population to rise.  Any fuel 
remaining at the end of the mission should be used to lower perigee as much as possible 
during the passivation process, resulting in the earliest possible reentry.  One caveat to 
this general rule, though, is that the last burn before an uncontrolled reentry should leave 
the spacecraft high enough so that its orbit remains stable long enough for ground 
tracking to get an accurate fix. This will allow monitoring of the vehicle for conjunction 
assessment and collision avoidance purposes as its apogee descends past other operating 
spacecraft. 
Figure 30.2-2  Projected Debris Generation by Mechanism (with no new launches after 
2009) 
 
Originally from the 13th Annual FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference, 
Orbital Debris & Space Traffic Control presentation by Gene Stansbery (JSC/ODPO)  
Also at http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv14i1.pdf, page 8.  
Complicated by the 2006 data.  ODPO has offered to print this for us without the 
confusing solid line data.   
30.3 Non-LEO Disposal Options 
The IADC guidelines define two protected regions of space: LEO and GEO.  No space 
vehicles should be left in either of these regions on a long- term basis.  The LEO region is 
simply defined as the “spherical region that extends from the Earth’s surface up to an 
altitude (Z) of 2000 km”.  Removal from the LEO region within 25 years is described in 
Section 30.2.  The GEO protected region is defined as 35,786 km +/- 200 km, with 
latitude of 0° +/- 15°.  Any mission that passes through that protected region must be 
maneuvered at the end of the mission to remain clear.  Removal from GEO should occur 
as soon as practical after the end of the mission. 
Figure 30.3-1  The IADC-defined Protected Regions of Space 
(from reference iii, page 5) 
 
Figure 30.3-2  Artist’s rendering of the IADC-defined Protected Regions 
(from reference iii, page 6) 
 
Disposal from GEO is performed by increasing the orbital radius sufficiently to remain 
well in excess of 200 km above the GEO altitude (35,786 km + 200 km = 35, 986 km 
minimum altitude) for a minimum of 100 years.  Due to the effects of solar radiation, as 
well as luni-solar and geopotential perturbations, the recommended minimum increase 
above GEO is defined as: 
(equation adapted from reference iii, page 18) 
200 km + 35 km + (1000 km x CR x A/m) 
Where:  35 km represents the effects of luni-solar and geopotential perturbations 
CR is the solar radiation pressure coefficient (typically 1 – 2 kg/m2) 
A/m is the spacecraft cross-sectional area to dry mass ratio (m2/kg) 
The altitude is generally increased, as opposed to decreasing, to prevent an accumulation 
of debris that future GEO missions would need to pass through to get to GEO, and to 
prevent potential signal interference.  In addition to increasing the orbital radius, the final 
orbit should be circularized to an eccentricity of no more than 0.003, and the spacecraft 
needs to be passivated as described in section 30.4.  It is estimated that the fuel required 
for responsible disposal of GEO missions is equivalent to that used for about 3 months of 
station-keeping for most spacecraftiv
Disposal from Earth orbits other than LEO and GEO (high eccentricity science orbits, for 
example) should minimize the orbit lifetime and avoid any highly used regions.  While 
the IADC guidelines are not specific, some national requirements documents include a 
protected region for 12 hour orbits, commonly used for navigation satellites.  Due to the 
wide variety of unusual orbits, it would be impossible to cover all possibilities in detail 
here.  The first priority of the end of mission planning, however, is minimization of the 
potential for on-orbit collisions.  As with LEO and GEO missions, any vehicle left in 
orbit must be passivated (see section 30.4) after the final maneuvers. 
.  The “Support to the IADC Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines” document contains further details on disposal from GEO. 
There are, as yet, few guidelines available for disposal of lunar, planetary, or Lagrange 
orbit missions.  The primary consideration, as it is for Earth orbits, is to minimize the 
potential for collisions with other current and future spacecraft, either directly or through 
generated debris.  Therefore, it is best to avoid leaving spacecraft in long-term orbits 
(>10 years) at the end of the mission, except in those cases where the spacecraft 
continues to serve as a communications relay after its primary mission.  Likewise, it is 
best to passivate any orbital hardware at the end of the mission, to prevent explosions and 
other breakups, which would generate additional debris that might interfere with future 
missions.  If disposal is to include lunar or planetary impact, care should be taken to 
avoid sites of scientific or historic value, as well as preventing organic contamination 
whenever possible. 
30.4 Passivation 
At the end of the mission, the IADC guidelines call for all on-board sources of stored 
energy to be “depleted or safed when they are no longer required for mission operations 
or post-mission disposal”, also known as passivation. The main concern is that stored 
residual energy has in the past resulted in explosions, which have been a major source of 
orbital debris.  Propulsion systems, batteries, and reaction wheels all contain stored 
energy, and are the most common components identified for passivation.  Since a 
spacecraft or launch vehicle could be in orbit and unattended for many years (even 
centuries) after the mission, it is important to passivate to prevent generation of debris 
that would increase the likelihood of collisions for other missions. 
30.4.1 Propulsion System Passivation 
Propulsion system explosions have resulted in some of the largest debris-producing 
events on orbit.  For example, in 1996, a Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System (HAPS) 
upper stage spontaneously exploded two years after delivering its payload, generating 
over 700 pieces of debris large enough to be tracked from the ground.  Because of a 
launch anomaly, this vehicle contained both propellant and high pressure gas, which were 
not able to be depleted.  The most likely cause of the explosion was a long-term regulator 
failure, which allowed the propulsion tank to become overpressurized.v
A propulsion system is designed to produce a controlled explosion, resulting in the 
desired thrust.  Unexpected events, though, (small debris impact to the tank, mixing of 
fuel and oxidizer, etc) can produce extremely destructive explosions.  Even residual 
pressurant gas (despite being chemically inert) can cause a propulsion tank to rupture 
catastrophically if, for example,  the tank is struck by small debris.  Propellants should be 
depleted by either burning or venting, and pressurant should be vented during disposal, to 
prevent future breakups and debris generation.  Residual propellant should be used to 
lower the perigee of LEO vehicles, to ensure that they de-orbit as soon as possible.  
Unfortunately, some propulsion system designs do not allow for complete passivation, 
unless this capability is specifically taken into account early in the design phase. 
   
There can be a number of challenges to depleting the fuel left on-board a spacecraft at the 
end of the mission.  Because sensors can become inaccurate, particularly near the end of 
the mission, when the residual propellant levels are low, it can be difficult to judge 
exactly how much propellant remains to be depleted.  It is recommended that, if possible, 
the propulsion system be monitored until some positive sign of completion is observed (a 
rapid pressure drop from pressurant venting through a thruster, for example).  If a 
significant amount of propellant remains to be expelled, it must be done in a manner that 
will not cause excessive disruption to the spacecraft attitude, or cause the spacecraft to 
spin beyond its design limits.  Since even directly opposed thrusters are not perfectly 
matched, this can be more difficult than first imagined.  Propulsion systems have also 
been observed to perform very differently as the propellant nears exhaustionvi
An example of a unique challenge was passivation of the TDRS-1 spacecraft after a very 
long and successful 26 year career.  Due to a modification in its mission, when the 
payload finally failed there was still a large excess of fuel on-board, which needed to be 
expended.  Since lowering perigee was not an option for a GEO mission, and using all 
remaining fuel to increase the altitude would cause the spacecraft to drift out of 
communications range during the maneuver, an alternative solution was developed.  The 
spacecraft was first raised to the disposal orbit, then essentially a flat spin was induced to 
exhaust the remaining fuel, while not disturbing the orbit or exceeding the spacecraft 
mechanical design.  In this way, the fuel was expended and the spacecraft was passivated 
before it drifted out of communications range.  This is an example of the creativity 
sometimes necessary to perform responsible passivation when it was not necessarily 
considered early in the design. 
. 
The IADC guidelines and most space agency regulations call for depletion of pressurant 
gas at the end of the mission, because residual pressure exerts stress on the tanks and 
other hardware.  The method of passivation varies based on the propulsion system design.  
In the case of a propellant tank with no diaphragm, it is usually possible to expel the 
pressurant gas by latching opposing thruster valves open at the end of the mission.  
Pressurant gas that is trapped behind a diaphragm, or in a separate tank, needs to be 
exhausted through a dedicated vent line.  Such vent lines should be designed so that they 
will not impart a significant thrust or spin to the spacecraft during passivation.  This can 
be accomplished by controlling the gas flow, and providing an omnidirectional outlet.   
30.4.2  Power System Passivation 
To date, batteries have exploded on-orbit on at least eight occasions, accounting for a 
portion of the debris currently in orbitvii
Lithium-ion batteries present special concerns, since they not only store electrical energy, 
but also contain potentially dangerous materials.  As with NiH2 batteries, overcharge 
produces heat and gas buildup which can result in cell rupture.  In addition, though, when 
discharged, the cells can plate out highly reactive lithium metal.  Since the charge 
conditions cannot necessarily be guaranteed throughout the post-mission period, it is very 
important to prevent any possibility of discharging and recharging lithium-ion batteries.  
Many lithium-ion battery assemblies have built-in ground safety disconnect relays to 
prevent this from occurring during the integration phase.  By designing in the ability to 
actuate these relays on-orbit, the batteries can be completely isolated from the power bus 
after disposal, and can neither charge nor discharge.  Of course, this concern is negated if 
the solar arrays are completely disconnected, and there is no way to re-charge the 
batteries. 
.  Most battery explosions result from excess gas 
pressure generated inside the battery case due to overcharging.  Nickel-hydrogen 
batteries, for example, typically operate at up to 1000 psi or more, directly related to the 
charge state.  It is therefore important to provide the hardware capability to physically 
disconnect at least the charging capacity from the batteries at the end of the mission.  The 
best approach is to physically disconnect the solar arrays from the power bus completely 
at the end of the mission.  Simply minimizing the battery charging rate is not sufficient, 
since that setting may change due to radiation damage, part failure, or other mechanisms 
during the long unattended orbit-decay period.  Remember that after spacecraft are 
decommissioned from GEO, they will be on orbit for centuries.  Some designers are 
traditionally reluctant to include any capability to completely disconnect the solar array 
or battery, however, since that creates the possibility for premature mission failure.  
Section 30.4.4 provides more information on passivation methods that are designed to 
retain mission reliability. 
30.4.3  Passivation of Other Systems 
The IADC guidelines also recognize the potential for post-mission damage from other 
systems.  Pressure vessels, self-destruct devices, and momentum wheels are all examples 
of components which can contain mechanical and chemical energy at the end of the 
mission.  Provisions need to be made during the design of such components to allow for 
them to be vented, safed, and/or spun down at the conclusion of the mission.  Some of 
these passivation steps can be simple.  For example, disabling power to momentum 
wheels is sufficient to allow them to spin down by internal friction.  The “Support to the 
IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” document contains guidance on systems that 
require passivation, and safe final conditions for them.  One additional system to consider 
for passivation is communications.  Whenever possible, the transmitting capability of the 
spacecraft should be disabled at the end of the mission, to prevent interference with 
future missions.  If the power system is properly passivated, both the momentum wheels 
and transmitter capability are passivated by default.  It is best to listen for any 
transmissions a few days after passivation, though, to ensure that the spacecraft has not 
recovered despite the intended shutdown. 
30.4.4  Passivation Challenges 
One difficulty in designing for adequate passivation is the potential creation of single 
points of failure for the mission.  For example, if a single command could erroneously be 
sent to vent the propellant or pressurant before or during operations, the entire mission 
could be lost.  Designers have long recognized this potential, and have employed 
techniques to positively prevent any such opportunities – preventing vent lines from 
being operable on orbit, for example.  Such hardware designs, however, often prevent 
adequate passivation of the spacecraft at the end of the mission as well.  In many ways, 
the inclusion of necessary passivation systems requires hardware designers to adopt a 
new approach to mission reliability.  Through the use of redundant hardware and end of 
mission software modifications, passivation can usually be designed into the system 
without presenting a single point of failure. 
One example of a way to provide for passivation, while preventing a single point failure 
mechanism is that of the Solar Dynamics Observer (SDO) battery passivation.  Designers 
have included the capability of actuating the built-in lithium-ion battery isolation relays 
on-orbit, but omitted the commands to do so from the command database for the duration 
of the mission.  Even if the commands were erroneously sent, they would not be 
recognized by the spacecraft.  At the end of the mission, the command options will be 
uploaded into a new software patch, allowing the relay actuation commands to be 
recognized and executed by the on-board hardware.  In addition, there is a pair of 
commands (arm and fire) necessary to actuate each relay.  This design has allowed SDO 
to design for responsible passivation at the end of the mission, yet retain reliability 
throughout the operational phase of the mission. 
Most spacecraft are also designed with autonomous fault detection and correction 
capabilities, which respond to abnormal spacecraft conditions in a way that keeps the 
spacecraft operating (or returns it to low level operation after a major anomaly).  Such 
capabilities, however, are contrary to the whole notion of postmission passivation, and 
may work to counteract any passivation procedures.  Passivation is, after all, an 
anomalous condition from the perspective of successful mission operations.  Autonomous 
recovery systems, then, need to be disabled before engaging in postmission passivation.  
Therefore, it is important to consider this phase of the mission when designing the 
operations modes and command structure.  Ideally, there should be a disposal mode of 
operations planned from the beginning, that would allow a complete and safe disposal 
after the mission – with proper safeguards to prevent inadvertently entering or exiting this 
mode, of course. 
Passivating missions that were designed and launched without explicit consideration of 
postmission passivation can present unique difficulties.  Often, it may not be possible to 
fully comply with the IADC guidelines, or other requirements.  Typically, it may be 
impossible to disable the autonomous recovery hardware built into the spacecraft design, 
so that the spacecraft constantly returns to a safe mode.  Another example is the inability 
to physically disconnect the battery or solar arrays from the charging circuit.  In such a 
case, it is important to consider the intent of passivation and debris limitation guidelines, 
so as to minimize the potential for creating additional debris.  For example, by reducing 
the NiH2 battery charging current to its lowest possible level, and leaving some benign 
loads enabled, it is often possible to keep the battery in a perpetual discharge condition, 
thus greatly reducing the risk of battery explosion by overcharging.  While compliance 
with the guidelines or other requirements is the most reliable approach, it may be 
necessary to perform less than complete passivation on some operational missions.  
Future missions, though, must be designed for complete passivation at the end of the 
mission, unless performing a controlled reentry disposal. 
When planning passivation procedures, it is necessary to consider the order in which 
steps must occur.  For example, the transmitter should typically be disabled last, so that 
all previous commands can be verified.  There may also be attitude control factors that 
need to be considered in order to ensure adequate communications or power needs.  
Generally, passivation begins with disabling recovery mechanisms, followed by 
passivating the propulsion, attitude control, power, and communications  systems.  Bear 
in mind that as each system is disabled, its contribution to the mission is lost, and the 
remaining steps need to be completed quickly; for example, before battery power is lost.  
Each spacecraft needs to be considered on its own merits, however, including any 
hardware degradation that may have occurred during the mission.  The specific 
passivation procedures for an individual vehicle should be reviewed and tested as 
thoroughly as possible before execution. 
30.5 Disposal Planning 
Depending on the method of disposal employed, the process may require anything from 
relatively simple  to highly complex preparation.  For instance, a small, low-altitude 
science mission with no propulsion system, reentering within 25 years, may need only to 
passivate the power system at the end of the mission.  A large spacecraft in LEO which 
requires a controlled reentry will require much more extensive planning in terms of 
maneuvers, communications, staffing, etc.  Planning for disposal often requires the 
coordination of a number of different disciplines, and can take months of preparation and 
testing.  Detailed written plans are often required to be submitted well in advance of the 
disposal. 
If the disposal involves maneuvers, care must be taken to prevent collision with other 
orbital assets and debris.  It is important to report in advance any significant maneuvers 
which will change the altitude of the spacecraft more than 1 kilometer, to ensure that the 
maneuver will not cause a collision.  In the United States, the primary tracking and 
conjunction assessment authority is USSTRATCOM.  That service is also available to 
some Commercial and Foreign Entities as well, through special arrangement.  In addition 
to checking planned maneuvers for conjunctions, it is important to plan any rapid orbit 
decay periods so that they take place slowly enough that the decaying orbit can be 
adequately characterized for continuous conjunction assessment activities.  This is 
especially important due to the potential threat to manned missions at low altitudes. 
As the end of the mission approaches, there can be a temptation to continue beyond the 
originally planned termination point.  The need for ending the mission might be driven by 
approaching the minimum fuel for de-orbit, declining reliability due to hardware 
degradation, or other factors which dictate that there may be a diminished or ineffective 
disposal, if not executed in the near-term.  In the case of a science mission, though, there 
is a desire to continue data collection, or there may be increased profits available by 
continuing a commercial mission.  All implications of such a decision need to be 
considered before continuing the mission, including increased risk of collision, orbital 
slot availability, RF interference, and reentry risk to the public.  Only when the overall 
risk of continuing is truly negligible, should continuing beyond a pre-planned mission 
completion be considered. 
30.6 FireSat II and SCS Examples 
Since both the FireSat II and SCS missions are assumed to be US Government-owned 
assets, they would need to meet the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices, which is in some ways more comprehensive than the IADC guidelines.  Not 
only the spacecraft, but also the launch vehicles for each mission must be considered for 
safe disposal, in terms of both orbital debris generation and reentry risk.  In most cases, 
the individual spacecraft from each mission would likely be retired one at a time, due to 
equipment failure or fuel reserves.  Since it is extremely rare for a mission to 
intentionally shed any debris during disposal, both of our example missions will be 
assumed to meet the operational debris requirement. 
30.6.1 Disposal of the FireSat II Spacecraft  
The FireSat II mission operational orbit is 700 km altitude, circular, at 55° inclination. At 
the end of the 3-5 year mission, it will be necessary to ensure that each spacecraft is 
removed from the LEO protected region within 25 years.  Orbital lifetimes can vary 
based on spacecraft mass and the area presented in the velocity direction, as well as the 
solar flux effects on the Earth’s atmosphere.  With body-mounted solar arrays, the 
Firesat II spacecraft is likely to tumble slowly after the mission, so an average cross-
sectional area would be assumed for orbital lifetime predictions.  With deployed solar 
arrays, the spacecraft may be more likely to adopt a gravity gradient stabilized 
orientation, presenting a different (likely higher) drag area.  Orbital lifetime predictions 
from the 700 km circular altitude can vary from just under 25 years to over 60 years, 
based on the launch year and spacecraft area.  It will most likely be necessary, then, to 
intentionally reduce the perigee of each Firesat II spacecraft as a part of the End of 
Mission disposal using all residual propellant, including the portion reserved for disposal 
operations. 
As discussed in Section 30.4, it will be necessary to passivate the FireSat II systems in 
order to prevent fragmentation during the up to 25 year orbital decay period.  Ideally, the 
mission operations concept would include a separate operations mode for disposal, 
intended to disable  automatic recovery of the spacecraft after it has been shutdown.  
Passivation steps include venting the propulsion system (including pressurant) and 
disconnecting the solar arrays from the power bus.  By permanently disconnecting the 
arrays, the remaining loads will deplete the battery and keep it discharged.  With the 
recovery systems disabled, the spacecraft should remain in an inert state until it reenters. 
Several of the other drivers for the FireSat II mission have led to a design which is 
relatively small, with insufficient fuel or control authority to perform a controlled reentry.  
Survival of even 15 individual pieces after reentry would cause FireSat II to exceed the 
required 1 in 10,000 reentry risk requirement.  It will therefore be necessary to consider 
reentry risk throughout the mission design phase, and to minimize the use of highly 
survivable materials whenever possible.  The spacecraft structure, for example, should be 
limited to graphite/ epoxy composite and/ or aluminum components (fasteners are 
generally too small to inflict significant injuries, and need not be considered for reentry 
risk purposes).  Solar cells are fragile enough to break up into relatively benign pieces, 
but any solar panel hinges and deployment hardware should avoid the use of titanium and 
stainless steel as much as possible.  Some high survivability materials are inevitable in 
the payload optics, but could possibly be bundled together to minimize their reentry risk. 
30.6.2 Disposal of the SCS Spacecraft  
The Supplemental Communications System (SCS) mission is intended to operate in a  
21,000 km altitude, circular orbit with a 0° inclination, greatly simplifying the disposal 
procedure.  In fact, this orbit is perhaps the simplest of the commonly used Earth orbits, 
since all that is necessary is to passivate the spacecraft in place.  The operational orbit 
meets the US Government requirement for Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) disposal, so there 
is no need for end of mission maneuvers.  It is still necessary, however, to expend all 
remaining fuel, and perform all other passivations tasks described for Firesat II, to 
minimize any possibility of fragmentation during the very long postmission storage 
period.  It is not necessary to consider reentry risk for SCS, since the spacecraft will not 
reenter for centuries, by which time some more permanent solution should be available if 
necessary. 
Conclusion 
The need to control the growth of orbital debris, particularly in LEO, is clear.  Toward 
this goal, the United Nations and individual space agencies have created guidelines and 
requirements that call for, among other things, responsible disposal of space hardware at 
the end of its useful mission life.  In order to perform responsible disposal, though, it 
must be considered during the mission planning in the earliest stages of the mission.  
The chosen disposal method often drives the hardware design, including propulsion 
system sizing, passivation hardware, materials selection, and even potentially the orbit 
selection.  Methods exist which will allow for passivation, while preserving mission 
reliability.  Designing each individual mission with responsible disposal in mind is a 
critical step toward minimizing the risk of future collisions for all missions. 
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